A new President has stated his intention to get immigration policy enacted in the current Congress. He would do well to consider the merits of a welldesigned immigration federalism. Probably no principle in immigration law is more firmly established, or of greater antiquity, than the plenary power of the federal government to regulate immigration. Equally canonical is the corollary notion, analogous to the dormant power doctrine in Commerce Clause jurisprudence, that this federal power is indivisible and therefore the states may not exercise any part of it without an express or implied delegation from Washington.
Despite the plenary power doctrine's authority, it has been assailed over the years by many academics and defended, I think, by none. Questioning its source in the Constitution, fit with other bodies of law, institutional implications, internal coherence, specific applications, and policy merits, critics have called for abandoning or significantly limiting it. Its detractors have also criticized the doctrine's failure to clarify how power is allocated between Congress and the President in situations where they disagree.
An interesting feature of these critiques of the plenary power doctrine is that the critics seem to have no difficulty accepting its corollary-the principle that federal authority over immigration preempts the states from playing any independent role in the development and administration of immigration law and policy. Indeed, they enthusiastically affirm and defend it. This conjunction of positions, which might otherwise seem illogical or at least awkward, is probably best explained by ideology and politics. As I have explained elsewhere, the immigration law professoriate occupies a position at the extreme left in the national debate over immigration.
In this article, I make the case for a more robust role for the states in certain areas of immigration policy. Part I confronts the assumption, almost universal among immigration law scholars, that the states are more hostile to immigrants, both documented and undocumented, than is Congress. Part II considers how Congress might delegate greater responsibility to the states, specifically in the areas of employment-based admissions, immigration enforcement, and employer sanctions, to strengthen federal immigration policy. Part III considers the validity of recently enacted state laws that directly affect immigrants but that Congress has not expressly authorized. I maintain that such laws should be upheld by the courts so long as they reflect a legitimate state interest and do not interfere with the goals of federal immigration policy, properly and conventionally understood.
The Myth of Greater State Hostility to Immigrants
Academic opponents of a state role in immigration, being ardently proimmigration-as am I; I consider myself a moderate expansionist-fear that to the extent that state authority is recognized in this field either by Congress or by the courts, the states (or their localities, if authorized) will adopt restrictive policies designed to harm the interests of legal aliens and especially of undocumented ones. The latter group is one for which these academics, despite their firm professional dedication to the rule of law, exhibit a remarkable, if understandable, solicitude. The situation becomes even more complex if one considers the now-conventional distinction between immigration law and policy (concerned with admission, administration of federal immigration benefits, and enforcement, including removal) and immigrant law and policy (concerned with how immigrants are treated once they are admitted or, in the case of the undocumented, otherwise enter the U.S.).
Yet it is far from clear that states not constrained by the plenary power doctrine and its preemption corollary would treat legal immigrants more harshly than the federal government does, or more harshly than reasonable (i.e., nonxenophobic) voters might think wise or fair. Some states (or more likely, localities) might do so, of course, but the evidence strongly suggests that the largest immigrant-receiving states, as well as some others, are in fact consistently more generous to immigrants, even including undocumented ones, than is Congress.
The post-1996 behavior of the states confirms this point. Anxieties over whether states would follow the federal government's lead in restricting public benefits for immigrants after its 1996 immigration reforms were assuaged when many states enacted new welfare programs to address the needs of illegal immigrants residing within their borders. One concern, for example, stemmed from the fact that the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act ("PRWORA") permitted states to deny most general welfare benefits to immigrants. As of 1999, however, many states had not exercised this option to make immigrants ineligible. Indeed, a survey of state welfare programs in areas ranging from food stamps to health care insurance found that the majority of states had passed at least one new state welfare program including immigrants after the 1996 Act.
The situation with driver's licenses and in-state tuition benefits also supports the claim that many states are more generous than Congress toward both legal and undocumented immigrants. Despite the REAL ID Act of 2005, which bars states from issuing driver's licenses or identification cards to most undocumented workers, eight states continue to issue driver's licenses to residents regardless of their immigration status. Likewise, many states-Texas, California, Utah, Washington, New York, Oklahoma, Illinois, Kansas, Nebraska, New Mexico, and perhaps others-have passed laws permitting certain undocumented students who have attended and graduated from their primary and secondary schools to pay the same tuition as their classmates at public institutions of higher education. This statistic might seem even more remarkable because these are the states in which most undocumented immigrants live. Many other states have been considering similar legislation.
Many of the leading destination cities for immigrants in the U.S. have expressly affirmed their solidarity with immigrants, including undocumented ones, by adopting policies instructing their officials to refrain from assisting or cooperating with federal immigration officials-this, in the face of a federal statutory provision prohibiting any official from restricting information exchange with federal officials concerning an individual's immigration status. Nevertheless, state attorneys general have aggressively sought to protect immigrant workers, even when it has put them at odds with federal immigration policy, and some have gone beyond quietly flouting that policy.
These actions bespeak a remarkable solicitude by public officials for both legal and undocumented immigrants in many of the receiving states and communities. Recent reports suggest that the same is true of the private sector and community groups. But even if this solicitude were less robust, an immigration policy that allocates regulatory power over immigration and immigrants between the federal government and the states on the basis of general, politically acceptable principles would be more desirable than a policy that simply favors whichever power allocation one or another commentator thinks might yield the most social services and welfare benefits for immigrants.
In the discussion that follows, I invoke one such broader principle, functional rationality, to argue that the legitimate goals of federal immigration policy might be better served if Congress authorized the states to act in certain areas. In Part II, I shall focus on three specific policy areas: employment-based admissions, integration with state and local criminal justice systems, and employer sanctions. The questions I address are, first, what would be the consequences of an express delegation of authority by Congress, and second, under what conditions would and should the courts affirm state authority in these three policy areas absent such a delegation.
Preliminarily, let us recall an essential but often overlooked fact about American public policy and governmental structure: the "federalist default" arrangement is for federal programs to rely, often heavily, on state and local involvement, including in the enforcement of federally-promulgated rules. Indeed, it is hard to think of a national program other than Social Security that is run entirely by the federal government without state involvement. Even national defense incorporates the state national guards. This enforcement-sharing default is all the more significant when one considers that in the vast majority of these policy domains where Congress delegates federal authority downward, Congress could if it wished exercise plenary federal authority without any constitutional impediment.
For present purposes, then, the fundamental question that this federalist default raises is this: why should immigration be treated differently? My answer, supported in the analysis that follows, is that it should not. The precise mix of federal and state authority and responsibility, of course, is and must always be domain-specific.
Let me briefly defend my use of the term "immigration federalism." Some federalist arrangements are based on the sovereignty of the states. This is not the species of federalism that I have in mind here. Although contemporary federalism and the jurisprudence that surrounds it are certainly influenced by such notions of constitutional state sovereignty, many if not most of the powers exercised by the states today are undertaken pursuant to a bewilderingly complex system of federal-state relationships in which the states participate in programs enacted and largely funded by Washington. This state participation can take many different forms: administration and/or enforcement of federally-established rules and policies; policy development and implementation within parameters (more or less constraining) set by federal policy-makers; federal funding of states to develop their own policies; and many other collaborative (though inevitably conflicting) arrangements. What I refer to as immigration federalism consists of arrangements such as these in which the states operate under, and are obliged to respect, federal immigration policies and supervision.
Delegating More Policy Authority to the States
In the U.S., as noted earlier, the plenary power doctrine and its dormant power corollary leave immigration policy as the sole responsibility of the federal government, subject only to such delegations of immigration authority to the states as Congress may choose to make. It is all the more striking, then, that some major immigrant-receiving nations delegate (or reserve) substantial authority over certain significant aspects of immigration policy to their states (Germany (Länder) and Australia), provinces (Canada), and cantons (Switzerland). In contrast, the U.S. remains a firm centralizer in immigration policy despite its robust tradition and structure-the federalist default-of state authority and administration in health care, education, national elections, taxation, and many other policy areas that in other countries are almost entirely the responsibility of national governments. Why, other than by virtue of immigration's relation to foreign affairs, should this exception to the federalist default exist and, more to the point, why should it be maintained? I explore this question by focusing on three distinct immigration policy problems where the states might play an effective role in better achieving national goals.
Employment-Based Admissions
Authority to determine the number of and criteria for admissions is at the very core of immigration policy. Indeed, in cases challenging the extent of the plenary power doctrine, the Supreme Court has emphasized that whatever constitutional limits might exist on that power, they do not apply to decisions and criteria concerning initial admission and entry. Under the immigration statute, the formulation and implementation of admissions policy are entirely matters for Congress, the Department of Homeland Security, the State Department, the Department of Labor, and the Department of Health and Human Services; the states have no significant role. Yet there is much to be said for exploiting the diversity among states with respect to one important immigration stream: employment-based admissions.
The essential premise of an alternative approach is that employment-based admissions primarily implicate local economic interests, particularly local labor markets, and that a decentralized system for deciding which petitioners should receive the federally-allotted visas-subject to federally-determined quotas and criteria-would ameliorate many problems that have long plagued the existing centralized system. In this proposal, developed by Davon Collins, Congress would set the eligibility standards for employment-based immigrants, the annual national quotas for as many employment-based subcategories as it wished to specify, and criteria for state participation, which would be voluntary. Congress would then distribute visa allotments to participating states in proportion to some index, such as the state's share of the national working-age population. Within the overall quotas, and subject to federal rules, states could buy and sell visa allotments among themselves. If this market proved too thin, the price could be set by federal law. Thereafter, each state would decide, in whatever manner it thought best, which individual petitioners would receive its allotment of visas. Within parameters set by federal law, the states would be free to regulate visa portability and other aspects of the immigrant employment relationship, including whether to grant employment-based visas at all. Congress would prescribe minimum labor standards, while mitigating race-to-the-bottom or other spillover effects.
Such a reform would increase the responsiveness of employment-based admissions to local economic conditions and priorities. The existing labor certification system, centralized in the Department of Labor, is notoriously slow, cumbersome, inflexible, politicized, manipulable, and ill-suited to a heterogeneous, and rapidly changing labor market. Although a state's employment-based admissions process might simply replicate the pathologies of the current federal labor certification system, it seems more likely that the relatively few states with low unemployment rates and a high demand for foreign workers would be more keenly aware of these needs, more eager to fix the problem, and more nimble in finding ways to do so than the federal government would. Moreover, the burdens imposed by immigrants-such as increased demand for public benefits and services, and downward pressure on wage ratesare disproportionately felt at the state and local level, which suggests that states are in the best position to assess and manage the tradeoffs among conflicting public goals peculiar to their polities. Finally, a less centralized system would let states experiment with different approaches to these problems without implicating the national economy or immigration policy.
State and Local Enforcement
Whether federal immigration law is under-enforced or over-enforced depends on one's perspective. Lawyers who represent immigrants and others who advocate on their behalf predictably view Immigrations and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") officials as all-powerful. They claim that enforcement is harsh and indiscriminate, arousing in the immigrant community unwanted fear, family breakup, and other forms of individual and communal dislocation. In support of this claim, they will cite workplace raids, excessive detention, unwarranted denial of asylum claims, neighborhood sweeps, Border Patrol abuses, deaths of desperate border-crossers on the highways and in the desert, removals of resident aliens for minor and longago crimes, and other aggressive enforcement tactics and immigrant hardships.
On the other hand, those favoring more effective enforcement view the immigration agency as feckless, listless, and toothless, despite its impressive arsenal of legal authority. In support of this view, they cite the low percentage of illegal aliens actually removed, their repeated crossings after they are apprehended and returned by the Border Patrol, the ease of acquiring fraudulent documents and unauthorized employment, the high absconding rates of those not detained pending removal hearings and of those removable aliens who receive "run letters" from the agency, the notorious failure to enforce sanctions against employers who (with a wink and a nod or studied inadvertence) hire unauthorized workers, the ability of some cities to frustrate federal enforcement, the reluctance of federal prosecutors to bring criminal cases against immigrants and even smugglers, the strong political and economic interests that countenance, protect, and even promote illegal migration, the long delays that hobble enforcement proceedings, and many other impediments.
I believe that both critiques are accurate: like many laws, immigration laws are simultaneously both under-and over-enforced. I say this even though, as I have argued elsewhere, some fraction of what we loosely call underenforcement may in fact be justified as a matter of policy: Illegal immigration, after all, confers significant benefits on almost all concerned, while the costs of eliminating it would be manifestly prohibitive. This means that the socially optimal level of illegal migration that balances its social benefits and costs is far greater than zero. In a nation of almost 300 million people, the optimal level of illegal immigration may even exceed today's estimated level of approximately 11-12 million undocumented residents, with 250,000 more added each year to the more or less permanent population.
But once the government has settled on an appropriate enforcement level, society has a compelling interest in seeing that the enforcement is carried out effectively at that level. For better and for worse, effective federal immigration enforcement often depends upon the extensive participation of state and local officials. This is particularly true regarding enforcement against immigrants who have been convicted of crimes in this country. The reason is that identifying, apprehending, arraigning, detaining, processing, and removing these immigrants usually requires that federal officials look to state and local systems of criminal justice systems, including their officials, data networks, detention facilities, and much more. Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that where enforcement against criminal aliens is concerned-unquestionably one of the highest policy priorities-federal immigration officials are practically impotent without the substantial help of the state and local criminal justice systems.
In an article published in 2000, a co-author and I described this dependence in detail and summarized it as follows: "Two important constraints necessitate this reliance. First, the INS does not determine in the first instance which aliens are criminals; that is the job of local police and of prosecutors and judges at all levels of government. Second, the INS controls only a tiny fraction of the resources dedicated nationally to criminal law enforcement." Drawing on data for 1998, we showed that the federal government removed fewer than twenty percent of the criminal aliens who were then under law enforcement supervision. We pointed out that its performance was even worse than the twenty percent figure suggested, considering that the vast majority of removable criminal aliens were at large in the community, either on probation or parole or free from criminal justice supervision altogether, and that new immigration flows were constantly replenishing and augmenting the stock of such aliens.
The federal government has steadily increased the number of criminal alien removals, from 56,000 in fiscal year 1998 to almost 89,000 in 2004. Although this may seem like an encouraging trend, one must keep it in perspective. Even the most recent number almost certainly remains a small fraction of the total criminal aliens under criminal justice supervision. This, despite the fact that, as we demonstrated, these should be "slam dunk" cases, as these things go. After all, the federal government knows who and where most of these criminal aliens are, and-because few of them have any valid legal defenses or political support-it possesses all the legal authority it needs to remove them.
We were hardly original in laying out the case for both improving coordination between federal immigration enforcement and state and local criminal justice systems, and increasing the authority of the latter to assist in the former. Several years earlier, Congress had endorsed this approach in the 1996 reforms, authorizing the Attorney General, under § 287(g) of the amended Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"), to enter into agreements with qualified state and local officials allowing them (at their own expense) to carry out investigation, apprehension, and detention functions for the federal agency. In 2005, Kris Kobach, a law professor and former aide to Attorney General John Ashcroft specializing in immigration issues, summarized the experience under this new § 287(g) authority, calling it "the quintessential force multiplier."
Even the difficulties associated with enhanced state and local participation-opponents argue that immigrants will fear cooperating with the police, and that police are not trained in immigration law-must still be balanced against whatever benefits to immigrant communities and to society at large that such participation generates. These benefits are surely greater than zero-Kobach cites many examples-but whether they are large enough to justify the costs is ultimately the pivotal question. In making this assessment, an important-perhaps even decisive-question, given the incomplete data and other uncertainties surrounding the analysis, is who should bear the burden of proof-the proponents of greater state and local participation authorized by § 287(g) and other programs, or the opponents of such programs? The fact that Congress and a growing number of state and local governments have in fact authorized these programs might justify shifting this burden of proof to the opponents.
Employer Sanctions
No commentator on immigration policy-not academics, not immigrant advocates, not the Bush administration, not the enforcement-only enthusiasts who engineered the draconian bill, HR 4437, adopted by the House in December of 2005, and certainly not FAIR and the other restrictionists-claims that employer sanctions have been effective. There is also widespread agreement on the reasons for its ineffectiveness; rampant and low-cost document fraud: egregiously lax enforcement by ICE, including only rare inspections and low and infrequent prosecutions and penalties, the inevitable consequence of which is to weaken employer incentives to reject documents that appear facially valid; a political economy of immigration at the federal level that countenances high levels of unauthorized employment; and a frequent public insouciance about conduct that many consider a victimless offense that strengthens the economy.
One is tempted to compare this enforcement failure to Prohibition, with the difference that the arguments favoring the underlying employer sanctions policy are far stronger than the policy of Prohibition. Suppose that some statesparticularly those on the border and elsewhere that are under political pressure to weaken the jobs "magnet" that attracts so many undocumented workers-were to enact employer sanctions laws and then to enforce them with the vigor so evidently lacking in ICE. These states might have much stronger reasons to make employer sanctions effective than the federal immigration authorities do. The concentration of the undocumented in a small number of states means that the adverse political and fiscal effects of these concentrations are also disproportionate to these states. This is most evident in the fiscal mismatch under which most tax revenues generated by immigrants, both legal and illegal, flow to Washington, and many other benefits of immigration (say, lower consumer prices) are also enjoyed nationally, while almost all of the costs (say, burdens on locally-funded social services, adverse effects on low-skilled Americans, and immigrant crime) are borne locally. In light of this fiscal mismatch, ICE's lassitude-the immense gap between enforcement rhetoric and actual performance-becomes that much less surprising.
What can be said against allowing states to impose employer sanctions that track federal law and might actually be enforced, thus augmenting these meager federal efforts? For the many private lawyers who represent employers or out-of-status immigrants and whose success depends in part on their ability to stymie enforcement, the answer is clear: the best employer sanctions regime is one that is weak and ineffective. From a public interest, rule-of-law perspective, however, there is only one argument against state employer sanctions that mimic the federal law: they somehow undermine federal policy. Yet it is hard to see how state employer sanctions provisions that are carefully drafted to track the federal employer sanctions law can be inconsistent with it-unless we take ineffective enforcement to be the "real" federal policy from which state law must not deviate.
The federal government, beginning with the President of the United States, routinely insists that the level of unauthorized workers is intolerably high, that something must be done about it, and that the key to any solution is to turn off the existing magnet of illegal employment, which can only be done by strengthening employer sanctions. Judging from the enormous increases in funding for the Border Patrol over the last decade, Congress is also convinced of this and has put its money where its mouth is. The legislation that failed in Congress in June 2007 also evinced this conviction. Far from favoring federal preemption, then, this situation cries out for state augmentation of employer sanctions as a matter of federal policy, not just state policy.
State employer sanctions laws consistent with federal policy are legally valid. Indeed, the Supreme Court's decision in De Canas v. Bica confirms this validity. There, the Court rejected a federal preemption defense and upheld a California statute that imposed sanctions on employers of undocumented immigrant workers. Although the employer in De Canas argued that certain provisions of the state law made it inconsistent with federal policy, the Court held that the law was consistent and furthered the federal purpose of reducing illegal employment of aliens.
For present purposes, the most salient fact about De Canas is that it was rendered in 1976, a decade before Congress enacted employer sanctions in the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 ("IRCA") thus strengthening De Canas's rationale. IRCA's own preemption provision, however, does present a stronger textual argument for preemption. Enacted a decade after De Canas, INA § 274A(h)(2) preempts "any State or local law imposing civil or criminal sanctions (other than through licensing and similar laws) upon those who employ . . . unauthorized aliens." This provision may supersede De Canas and bar state employer sanctions taking the form of fines. But its plain text indicates that IRCA would not preempt (and might even be interpreted to authorize) sanctions that allow the suspension of business licenses for employers of the undocumentedone form that recent state and local laws (perhaps mindful of this provision) tend to take. Moreover, of the few challenges to state laws on the basis of IRCA's preemption clause, all of which have sought to invalidate parts of state workers compensation schemes, none has been successful.
The dispositive question, then, is what the courts (and what I) mean by "mimicking" the federal policy in situations where Congress has not expressly delegated regulatory or enforcement authority to the states. (Other judicial formulations include being "consistent with," "tracking," "mirroring," "reinforcing.") I address this question below.
Consistency with Federal Policy
Many states and localities have considered, and some have enacted, legislation dealing with undocumented immigrants. A set of disparate policies is emerging. As noted earlier, some state and local laws and policies adopted in recent years are intended to promote the interests of immigrants, including undocumented ones, and to shield them from federal enforcement. Others seek to exclude them through laws that are being challenged in the courts as being beyond the authority of the states and localities.
Although the wisdom of many, if not most, of these new laws is doubtful (or worse), my purpose here is not to assess their underlying policies, but rather to consider the general legal principles that should apply in determining whether or not they are preempted by the federal government's plenary power over immigration. As just noted, the decisive principle is that they be consistent with, track, mirror, or reinforce federal law and policy. This principle would seem clearly to condemn provisions like the city of Hazleton's $1000 rental fine that goes beyond employer sanctions to penalize vendors like landlords. Just as clearly, it is permissible for states to collaborate with the federal government in advancing federal immigration objectives. For example, although the federal government traditionally distributed food stamps for eligible immigrants, at least 17 states now supplement the federally-funded benefits by purchasing food stamps to distribute to some people, including some immigrants, who are not eligible under federal law. Immigration is no different than other fields in which cooperative federalism arrangements of this kind exist.
Enlisting state officials to aid federal enforcement officials in the apprehension of undocumented aliens-again, pursuant to federal standardsillustrates another form of collaboration. Federal preemption simply does not apply in these situations. Other state laws may raise more difficult preemption issues. Neither the Supreme Court nor the lower federal courts have precisely defined when a state law bearing on immigration is consistent with, tracks, mirrors, or reinforces federal policy. If these terms mean anything, however, they must, absent express preemption, apply to protect state laws that do more than merely duplicate federal laws by employing their identical language. They must also-again, absent express preemption-protect state laws that are consistent with, but less punitive or restrictive than, the federal counterpart.
Although the Supreme Court has not precisely defined the location of these preemption boundaries, it has provided some guidance. Two cases are most relevant. De Canas v. Bica, discussed earlier, upheld a California law that penalized employers of undocumented immigrant workers even at a time when federal law did not impose such penalties. Six years later, in Plyler v. Doe, the Court struck down a Texas statute that allowed local school districts to deny enrollment to noncitizen children of undocumented aliens and that withheld state funds for the education of these children. From these and other preemption cases, one can discern three basic tests that are satisfied when a state law is found to track, mirror, reinforce, or be consistent with a federal law.
First, the state regulation must accord with congressional intent. This requirement has two aspects. For one thing, the Supreme Court stated in De Canas that state regulations must "give way to paramount federal legislation" if Congress intended to effect a "complete ouster of state power including state power to promulgate laws not in conflict with federal laws." The Court elaborated on this in Plyler, where the Court invalidated a state law that it distinguished from the one upheld in De Canas, arguing that the state laws challenged in De Canas were upheld because they broadly "reflected Congress' intention to bar from employment all aliens except those possessing a grant of permission to work in this country." Second, the Supreme Court emphasized in De Canas, and in Plyler's discussion of De Canas, the requirement that the state law mirror and promote federal objectives. This kind of reinforcement of federal policy would defeat a claim of conflict preemption, although this would not suffice to protect the state law in a case of field preemption. De Canas also made clear, however, that establishing field preemption of state immigration law required an express statement of congressional intent, and that Congress had not voiced its desire to preempt this entire field.
Finally, a state law, in order to survive a preemption challenge, must not interfere or conflict with federal policies. This principle, like those already discussed, is also mentioned in De Canas and Plyler. The Supreme Court in Plyler, in striking down the law in question, stressed that the state classification did not "operate harmoniously within the federal program," while the De Canas Court emphasized that Congress had given no indication that it intended to preclude "even harmonious state regulation." State employer sanction laws that operate in the same manner as the federal law satisfy this test of harmoniousness.
This final requirement, that the state immigration law not undercut federal goals, is easy enough to state, but it can be difficult to apply. In Buckman Company v. Plaintiffs' Legal Committee, for example, the Supreme Court considered whether state law claims of fraud against the FDA conflicted with, and were therefore impliedly preempted by, federal law. In ruling that the state claims were indeed preempted, the Court held that "state-law fraud-on-the-FDA claims inevitably conflict with the FDA's responsibility to police fraud consistently with the Administration's judgment and objectives," and that, "[a]s a practical matter, complying with the FDA's detailed regulatory regime in the shadow of 50 States' tort regimes will dramatically increase the burdens facing potential applicantsburdens not contemplated by Congress in enacting the [federal statutes]." The Court reasoned that the federal regulatory requirements could be undermined not just by state laws that relaxed those requirements, but also by state claims that functionally imposed additional requirements beyond those established by the federal agency.
The relation between federal and state interests in these two situations, however, is quite different. In Buckman, no state could plausibly show that it was not sufficiently protected by the FDA's requirements. In the immigration context, as we saw earlier, some states do in fact shoulder a disproportionate share of the burdens imposed by undocumented immigrants due to a combination of large concentrations of this group within those states, the fiscal mismatch discussed earlier, and patently inadequate federal enforcement. Just as state law penalties for illegal gun-running may be imposed by states that seek additional deterrence because, say, gun-running is especially profitable there, so may some states have a legitimate interest in calibrating their balance of benefits and penalties to reflect their assessments of the local effects, both positive and negative, of undocumented immigration.
Indeed, Congress has explicitly signaled its recognition that different states may assess these local effects differently by allowing states to award undocumented aliens public benefits beyond those otherwise permitted by federal law, and to use state law enforcement officials to enforce immigration laws. In these ways, Congress has enabled states to define optimal deterrence levels in state-specific ways.
Congress's tortured failure to enact comprehensive immigration reform legislation in 2007 adds one more complexity to this analysis. Since the legislation would have strengthened the federal employer sanctions in a variety of ways, one might argue that the failure to enact the bill should be taken as evidence that Congress was sufficiently content with the status quo to maintain it, and that new state employer sanction laws should not be allowed to disturb it. The better and more politically realistic view of the situation, however, is that this development has no bearing on the validity of new state laws that are consistent with and reinforce existing federal law. Indeed, such state laws are likely to proliferate in the enforcement void left by the death of comprehensive federal legislation.
This analysis explains why state employer sanction laws that are consistent with federal policy should be upheld, while the vendor portions of the Hazleton landlord ordinance and its ilk should be preempted. Congress has not deployed sanctions against landlords and other vendors as an instrument of federal immigration enforcement during more than twenty years under IRCA. Although vendor sanctions might well deter undocumented migration, Congress has provided that even the undocumented, barred from employment, must not be deprived by states from enjoying the bare necessities of survival, specifically access to emergency health care and short-term non-cash disaster relief. Having a roof over one's head seems like such a necessity, where employment is differentor so Congress has decreed.
Conclusion
In the administration and enforcement of immigration policy, the federal government needs all the help it can get. The plenary power doctrine clearly authorizes Congress to control the contours and implementation of this policy, just as is true of analogous principles in other fields-such as the regulation of interstate commerce-in which the Constitution has been interpreted to delegate broad (and if Congress wishes, exclusive) legislative power to Congress. As a matter of sound policy, however, Congress should allow the states, which have in some respects an even greater stake in the effective administration and enforcement of immigration law than the federal government does, to play a discrete, carefully tailored role without jeopardizing legitimate federal interests, properly understood. My analysis suggests that the states, working under federal standards, could make important contributions to the advancement of federal immigration policy in at least three areas: employment-based admissions, state and local enforcement, and employer sanctions. There may well be others. It is time to take the possibilities of immigration federalism more seriously.
